Labor Code California Altered Ego Jurisdiction to Review the Decision

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Second Division

June 21, 2017

Yard.R. No. 224099

ROMMEL 1000. ZAMBRANO, ROMEO O. CALIPAY, JESUS L. Chin, LYNDON B. APOSAGA, BONIFACIO A. CASTANEDA, ROSEMARIE P. FALCUNIT, ROMEO A. FINALLA, LUISITO G. GELLIDO, JOSE ALLI Fifty. MABUHAY, VICENTE A. MORALES, RAUL L. REANZARES, DIODITO I. TACUD, ERNAN D. TERCERO, LARRY V. MUTIA, ROMEO A. GURON, DIOSDADO S. AZUSANO, BENEDICTO D. GIDAYAWAN, LOWIS Thou. LANDRITO, NARCISO R. ASI, TEODULO BORAC, SANTOS J. CRUZADO, JR., ROLANDO DELA CRUZ, RAYMUNDO, MILA Y. ABLAY, ERMITY F. GABUCAY, PABLITO One thousand. LACANARIA, MELCHOR PENAFLOR, ARSENIO B. PICART Three, ROMEO M. SISON, JOSE VELASCO JR., ERWIN M. VICTORIA, PRISCO J. ABILO, WILFREDO D. ARANDIA, ALEXANDER Y. HILADO, JAIME M. CORALES, GERALDINE C. MAUHAY, MAURO P. MARQUEZ, JONATHAN T. BARQUIN, RICARDO K. CALDERON JR., RENA TO R. RAMIREZ, VIVIAN P. VIRTUDES, DOMINGO P. COSTANTINO JR., RENATO A. MANAIG, RAFAEL D. CARILLO, Petitioners
vs.
PHILIPPINE Carpeting MANUFACTURING CORPORATION/ PACIFIC CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, DAVIDE. T. LIM, and EVELYN LIM FORBES, Respondents

D E C I S I O Northward

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Dominion 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set bated the January 8, 2016 Determination 1 and April 11, 2016 Resolution2 of the Courtroom of Appeals (CA) in CA-Chiliad.R. SP No. 140663, which affirmed the February 27, 2015 Decision3 and March 31, 2015 Resolution4 of the National Labor Relations Committee (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 01-00109-fourteen; 01-00230-14; 01-00900-14; 01-01025-xiv; and 01-01133-14, for five (5) consolidated complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor do.

The Antecedents

The petitioners averred that they were employees of private respondent Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (Phil Carpet). On Jan 3, 2011, they were notified of the termination of their employment effective February three, 2011 on the footing of cessation of functioning due to serious business losses. They were of the belief that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of due process considering the closure of Phil Carpet was a mere pretense to transfer its operations to its wholly endemic and controlled corporation, Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PacificCarpet). They claimed that the task orders of some regular clients of PhilCarpet were transferred to Pacific Carpet; and that from October to November 2011, several machines were moved from the bounds of Phil Carpet to Pacific Rug. They asserted that their dismissal constituted unfair labor practice as information technology involved the mass dismissal of all union officers and members of the Philippine Carpeting Manufacturing Employees Association (PHILCEA).

In its defense, Phil Rug countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased its operations because there had been a steady decline in the demand for its products due to global recession, stiffer competition, and the effects of a changing market. Based on the Audited Financial Statements5 conducted past SGV & Co., it incurred losses of ₱4.1M in 2006; ₱12.8M in 2007; ₱53.28M in 2008; and ₱47.79M in 2009. As of the cease of October 2010, unaudited losses already amounted to ₱26.59M. Thus, in order to stem the haemorrhage, the company implemented several price-cutting measures, including voluntary back-up and early on retirement programs. In 2007, the car carpet partition was airtight. Moreover, from a high production capacity of about 6,000 foursquare meters of carpeting a month in 2002, its final production capacity steadily went down to an average of 350 square meters per month for 2009 and 2010. After, the Board of Directors decided to approve the recommendation of its management to cease manufacturing operations. The termination of the petitioners' employment was effective as of the close of office hours on Feb 3, 2011. Phil Carpet likewise faithfully complied with the requisites for closure or cessation of concern under the Labor Code. The petitioners and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) were served written notices one (1) month earlier the intended closure of the company. The petitioners �were likewise paid their separation pay and they voluntarily executed their corresponding Release and Quitclaim6 before the DOLE officials.

The LA Ruling

In the September 29, 2014 Conclusion, seven the Labor Czar (LA) dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. It ruled that the termination of the petitioners' employment was due to total cessation of manufacturing operations of Phil Carpet considering it suffered continuous serious business losses from 2007 to 2010. The LA added that the closure was truly dictated past economic necessity as evidenced by its audited fiscal statements. It observed that written notices of termination were served on the DOLE and on the petitioners at least one (1) month before the intended date of closure. The LA farther institute that the petitioners voluntarily accepted their separation pay and other benefits and somewhen executed their individual release and quitclaim in favor of the company. Finally, it declared that there was no showing that the total closure of operations was motivated by any specific and conspicuously determinable union activity of the employees. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint of Domingo P. Constantino, Jr. on basis of prescription of cause of action and the consolidated complaints of the balance of complainants for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 8

Unconvinced, the petitioners elevated an appeal earlier the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In its Feb 27, 2015 Decision, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the LA. Information technology held that the Audited Financial Statements testify that Phil Rug continuously incurred net losses starting 2007 leading to its closure in the year 2010. The NLRC added that Phil Rug complied with the procedural requirements of effecting the closure of business pursuant to the Labor Code. Thefallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainants' appealfrom the Decision of the Labor Arbiter Marita V. Padolina is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

And so ORDERED. 9

Undeterred, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof. In its resolution, dated March 31, 2015, the NLRC denied the same.

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, dated January eight, 2016, the CA ruled that the total abeyance of Phil Carpet's manufacturing operations was non made in bad faith considering the same was clearly due to economic necessity. It determined that there was no convincing evidence to bear witness that the regular clients of Phil Carpet secretly transferred their job orders to Pacific Carpet; and that Phil Carpet's machines were not transferred to Pacific Carpet only were actually sold to the latter afterwards the closure of business as shown by the several sales invoices and official receipts issued past Phil Carpeting. The CA adjudged that the dismissal of the petitioners who were marriage officers and members of PHILCEA did not constitute unfair labor practice considering Phil Carpet was able to show that the closure was due to serious business losses.

The CA opined that the petitioners' merits that their termination was a mere pretense because Phil Carpet continued operation through Pacific Carpeting was unfounded because mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or almost all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient footing for disregarding the dissever corporate personality. The CA disposed the petition in this wise:

WHEREFORE, bounds considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

And then ORDERED. 10

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the CA in its assailed resolution, dated April xi, 2016.

Hence, this nowadays petition.

EventDue south

WHETHER THE PETITIONERS WERE DISMISSED FROM EMPLOYMENT FOR A LAWFUL CAUSE

WHETHER THE PETITIONERS' TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE

WHETHER PACIFIC Carpeting MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR PHIL Rug'S OBLIGATIONS

WHETHER THE QUITCLAIMS SIGNED BY THE PETITIONERS ARE VALID AND BINDING

The petitioners fence that Phil Carpet did not totally stop its operations; that most of the job orders of Phil Carpet were transferred to its wholly owned subsidiary, Pacific Carpet; and that the signing of quitclaims did not bar them from pursuing their case because they were made to believe that the closure was legal.

In its Annotate, 11 dated August 26, 2016, Phil Carpet averred that the termination of the petitioners' employment equally a result of its full closure and cessation of operations was in accordance with law and supported by substantial show; that the petitioners could only offer bare and self-serving claims and sham evidence such as financial statements that did not pertain to Phil Carpet; and that under the Labor Code, any compromise settlement voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the regional role of the DOLE was final and binding upon the parties.

In their Respond, 12 dated November 8, 2016, the petitioners alleged that the losses of Phil Carpeting were about proportionate to the net income of its subsidiary, Pacific Carpet; and that the declared auction, which transpired between Phil Carpet and Pacific Carpet, was fake.

The Court'south Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The petitioners were terminated fromemploymentfor an authorized cause

Under Article 298 (formerly Article 283) of the Labor Lawmaking, closure or abeyance of operation of the institution is an authorized cause for terminating an employee, viz.:

Article 298. Closure of establishment and reduction ofpersonnel. -The employer may also terminate the employment ofany employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the establishment or undertaking unless the endmost is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Championship, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least 1 (1) month before the intended appointment thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least 1 (1) calendar month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to foreclose losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking non due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall exist equivalent to at to the lowest degree i (ane) month pay or at least half (ane/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least half-dozen (half-dozen) months shall be considered every bit one (1) whole year. [Emphases supplied]

Closure of business is the reversal of fortune of the employer whereby in that location is a complete cessation of business operations and/or an actual locking-up of the doors of establishment, usually due to fiscal losses. Closure of business, as an authorized cause for termination of employment, aims to prevent further financial drain upon an employer who cannot pay anymore his employees since business has already stopped. In such a example, the employer is generally required to give separation benefits to its employees, unless the closure is due to serious business losses. thirteen

Further, in Industrial Timber Corporation v. Ababon, 14 the Court held:

A reading of the foregoing law shows that a fractional or total closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking may either be due to serious business organization losses or financial reverses or otherwise. Under the outset kind, the employer must sufficiently and convincingly prove its allegation of substantial losses, while under the 2nd kind, the employer tin can lawfully close store anytime as long as abeyance of or withdrawal from business operations was bona fide in graphic symbol and not impelled past a motive to defeat orcircumvent the tenurial rights of employees, and every bit long as he pays his employees their termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length of service. Only as no police forces anyone to go into business, no law can compel anybody to go on the aforementioned. Information technology would be stretching the intent and spirit of the constabulary if a court interferes with management's prerogative to close or cease its business organization operations just considering the business organization is non suffering from any loss or considering of the desire to provide the workers continued employment.

In sum, under Article 283 of the Labor Code, iii requirements are necessary for a valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least i month before the intended date thereof; (b) the abeyance of business must be bona fide in graphic symbol; and (c) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to ane calendar month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. 15 [citations omitted]

In this case, the LA's findings that Phil Rug suffered from serious business losses which resulted in its closure were affirmed in toto by the NLRC, and subsequently by the CA. It is a rule that absent any showing that the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and the appellate court are not supported by bear witness on tape or the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, the Court shall not examine afresh the prove submitted by the parties. 16 In Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, 17 the Court explained the reasons therefor, to wit:

The Supreme Courtroom is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with greater forcefulness in labor cases. Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve. In this case, the factual problems have already been adamant by the labor czar and the National Labor Relations Commission. Their findings were affirmed past the CA. Judicial review by this Court does non extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the prove upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its decision.

Indeed, factual findings of labor officials who are accounted to have acquired expertise in matters within their corresponding jurisdictions are more often than not accorded not merely respect, but fifty-fifty finality, and are binding on the Supreme Courtroom. Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal, particularly when supported by substantial bear witness. Consequently, the Supreme Courtroom is non duty-spring to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absenteeism of a articulate showing that the same were capricious and bereft of any rational footing. 18

Fifty-fifty after perusal of the records, the Court finds no reason to take exception from the foregoing rule. Phil Carpet continuously incurred losses starting 2007, equally shown by the Audited Financial Statements 19 which were offered in evidence by the petitioners themselves. The petitioners, in claiming that Phil Carpeting continued to earn profit in 2011 and 2012, overlooked the reason for such income, which was Phil Carpeting'south act of selling its remaining inventories. All the same such income, Phil Carpeting continued to incur total comprehensive losses in the amounts of ₱9,559,716 and ₱12,768,277 for the years 2011 and 2012, respectively. 20

Further, even if the petitioners turn down to consider these losses equally serious enough to warrant Phil Carpet's total and permanent closure, information technology was a business judgment on the part of the visitor'due south owners and stockholders to end operations, a judgment which the Courtroom has no concern interfering with. The only limitation provided past law is that the closure must be "bonafide in character and non impelled by a motive to defeat or circumvent thetenurial rights of employees."21 Thus, when an employer complies with the foregoing conditions, the Courtroom cannot prohibit closure "just because the business is not suffering from any loss or considering of the desire to provide the workers continued employment."22

Finally, Phil Carpet notified DOLE23 and the petitioners24 of its decision to cease manufacturing operations on January 3, 2011, or at least i (1) calendar month prior to the intended date of closure on February 3, 2011. The petitioners were as well given separation pay equivalent to 100% of their monthly basic bacon for every year of service.

The dismissal of the petitioners did not amount to unfair labor practice

Article 259 (formerly Commodity 248) of the Labor Code enumerates the unfair labor practices of employers, to wit:

Art. 259. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers. - It shall exist unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:

(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the practise of their correct to self-arrangement;

(b) To crave a:southward a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from ane to which he belongs;

(c) To contract out services or functions beingness performed by wedlock members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the practice of their right to self-arrangement;

(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the germination or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of fiscal or other support to information technology or its organizers or supporters;

(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in social club to encourage or discourage membership in whatsoever labor arrangement. Nothing in this Code or in whatever other law shall end the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining amanuensis may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid past members of the recognized commonage bargaining agent, if such non-union members take the benefits under the collective bargaining agreement: Provided, That the private potency required nether Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall non utilize to the non-members of the recognized collective bargaining agent;

(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;

(k) To violate the duty to deal collectively every bit prescribed by this Code;

(h) To pay negotiation or chaser's fees to the union or its officers or agents as function of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or

(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.

Unfair labor exercise refers to acts that violate the workers' right to organize.25 There should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor do in essence relate to the workers' right to self-organization.26 Thus, an employer may but be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in any style the correct of his employees to self-organize. 27

The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving it. Although there are exceptions to this general dominion, in the case of unfair labor practice, the alleging party has the burden of proving it. 28 In the case of Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (NUBE) v. Confesor,29 this Court elaborated:

In order to evidence that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial bear witness is required to support the claim. Substantial show has been defined every bit such relevantevidence as a reasonable heed might accept as acceptable to back up a conclusion. 30 [Accent supplied]

Moreover, good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the aforementioned. 31

The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them. They did non place the acts of Phil Carpet which, they claimed, constituted unfair labor practice. They did non fifty-fifty point out the specific provisions which Phil Carpeting violated. Thus, they would accept the Court pronounce that Phil Carpeting committed unfair labor practice on the footing that they were dismissed from employment merely because they were union officers and members. The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice, nonetheless, cannot exist understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically exist decided in favor of labor.32

In this case, equally far as the pieces of evidence offered past the petitioners are concerned, there is no showing that the closure of the company was an effort at union-busting. Hence, the charge that Phil Rug is guilty of unfair labor do must fail for lack of merit.

Pacific Carpethasapersonalityseparateand singled-out from Phil Rug

The petitioners, in asking the Court to disregard the split corporate personality of Pacific Carpet and to make it liable for the obligations of Phil Carpeting, rely heavily on the former being a subsidiary of the latter.

A corporation is an artificial being created past operation of law. It possesses the correct of succession and such powers, attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its being. Information technology has a personality separate and singled-out from the persons composing it, as well as from any other legal entity to which may be related. 33

Equally well-settled is the principle that the corporate mask may exist removed or the corporate veil pierced when the corporation is just an change ego of a person or of another corporation. For reasons of public policy and in the interest of justice, the corporate veil will justifiably exist impaled merely when it becomes a shield for fraud, illegality or inequity committed against third persons. 34

Hence, any application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil should be done with circumspection. A court should be mindful of the milieu where it is to be applied. It must be certain that the corporate fiction was misused to such an extent that injustice, fraud, or crime was committed against some other, in disregard of rights. The wrongdoing must be clearly and assuredly established; it cannot be presumed. Otherwise, an injustice that was never unintended may result from an erroneous awarding. 35

Farther, the Court's ruling in Philippine National Bank v. HydroResources Contractors Corporation 36 is enlightening, viz.:

The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in iii (3) basic areas, namely: ane) defeat of public convenience as when the corporate fiction is used every bit a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; two) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3) alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is and so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted every bit to get in merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or offshoot of another corporation.

x x x x

In this connection, case law lays down a 3-pronged test to determine the application of the alter ego theory, which is likewise known as the instrumentality theory, namely:

(1) Command, non mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not simply of finances but of policy and business organization practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own;

(2) Such command must have been used past the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust human activity in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and

(three) The aforesaid control and alienation of duty must have proximately caused the injury or unjust loss complained of.

The first prong is the "instrumentality" or "command" test. This examination requires that the subsidiary exist completely under the control and domination of the parent. Information technology examines the parent corporation's relationship with the subsidiary. Information technology inquires whether a subsidiary corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are then conducted equally to brand it a mere instrumentality or agent of the parent corporation such that its separate existence every bit a distinct corporate entity will be ignored. It seeks to establish whether the subsidiary corporation has no autonomy and the parent corporation, though acting through the subsidiary in course and advent, "is operating the business directly for itself."

The second prong is the "fraud" test. This test requires that the parent corporation'south conduct in using the subsidiary corporation be unjust, fraudulent or wrongful.1�wphi1 It examines the relationship of the plaintiff to the corporation. It recognizes that piercing is appropriate merely if the parent corporation uses the subsidiary in a way that harms the plaintiff creditor. As such, information technology requires a showing of "an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness."

The third prong is the "harm" examination. This test requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant's command, exerted in a fraudulent, illegal or otherwise unfair manner toward it, caused the impairment suffered. A causal connection between the fraudulent conduct committed through the instrumentality of the subsidiary and the injury suffered or the damage incurred past the plaintiff should be established. The plaintiff must prove that, unless the corporate veil is pierced, it volition have been treated unjustly past the defendant'due south exercise of control and improper employ of the corporate form and, thereby, suffer damages.

To summarize, piercing the corporate veil based on the alter ego theory requires the concurrence of three elements: command of the corporation by the stockholder or parent corporation, fraud or central unfairness imposed on the plaintiff, and harm or impairment acquired to the plaintiff by the fraudulent or unfair human activity of the corporation. The absence of any of these elements prevents piercing the corporate veil.37 [Citations omitted]

The Court finds that none of the tests has been satisfactorily met in this case.

Although ownership by 1 corporation of all or a cracking bulk of stocks of some other corporation and their interlocking directorates may serve every bit indicia of control, by themselves and without more than, these circumstances are insufficient to establish an change ego relationship or connection between Phil Carpet on the one hand and Pacific Rug on the other hand, that will justify the puncturing of the latter'southward corporate cover.38

This Court has declared that "mere buying past a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the upper-case letter stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient footing for disregarding the carve up corporate personality."39 It has as well ruled that the "beingness of interlocking directors, corporate officers and shareholders is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction in the absenteeism of fraud or other public policy considerations."xl

It must be noted that Pacific Carpet was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 29, 1999,41 such that it could non be said that Pacific Carpet was prepare up to evade Phil Carpeting'southward liabilities. As to the transfer of Phil Carpet'south machines to Pacific Carpet, settled is the dominion that "where one corporation sells or otherwise transfers all its avails to another corporation for value, the latter is not, by that fact lonely, liable for the debts and liabilities of the transferor. "42

All told, the petitioners failed to present substantial evidence to prove their allegation that Pacific Rug is a mere change ego of Phil Carpet.

The quitclaims were valid and binding upon the petitioners

Where the person making the waiver has washed so voluntarily, with a full agreement thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as being a valid and bounden undertaking.43 Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against policy, except (1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face up; in these cases, the law will pace in to counteract the questionable transactions. 44

In this case, the petitioners question the validity of the quitclaims they signed on the ground that Phil Carpet's closure was a mere pretense. As the closure of Phil Carpet, however, was supported by substantial evidence, the petitioners' reason for seeking the invalidation of the quitclaims must necessarily fail. Further, equally aptly observed by the CA, the contents of the quitclaims, which were in Filipino, were articulate and simple, such that it was unlikely that the petitioners did not understand what they were signing.45 Finally, the amount they received was reasonable as the same complied with the requirements of the Labor Lawmaking.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January eight, 2016Decision and April 11, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 140663, are AFFIRMED intoto.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Acquaintance Justice

Nosotros CONCUR:

(On Official Leave)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO Grand. PERALTA Associate Justice

(On Leave) MARVIC 1000.V.F. LEONEN Acquaintance Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O Due north

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courtroom�southward Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Acquaintance Justice
Interim Chairperson, Second Sectionalization

C E R T I F I C A T I O North

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article 8 of the Constitution and the Partitioning Acting Chairperson�due south Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the in a higher place Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courtroom�s Sectionalisation.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Master Justice

Footnotes

* On Official Leave.

** Per Special Order No. 2445 dated June 16, 2017.

*** On Leave.

i Penned past Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia with Acquaintance Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba and Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, concurring; rollo (Vol. I), pp. 38-l.

2 Id. at 52-54.

iii The NLRC Decision was not attached to the petition.

4 The NLRC Resolution was not attached to the petition.

5 Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 124-208.

six Rollo (Vol. Ii), pp. 647-691.

7 Penned by Labor Arbiter Marita Five. Padolina; rollo (Vol. I), pp. 56-83.

8 Id. at 83.

9 Id. at 43.

x Id. at 49.

eleven Rollo (Vol. Ii), pp. 1138-1164.

12 Id. at 1174-1186.

13 Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. v. Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. Employees Union-0/a/ia, 722 Phil. 846, 855 (2013).

14 515 Phil. 805 (2006).

15 Id. at 819.

16 Ignacio v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 417 Phil. 747, 752 (2001).

17 416 Phil. 310 (2001).

xviii Id. at 318.

nineteen Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 124-208.

twenty Id. at 218-262.

21 Article 298, Labor Code.

22 Angeles five. Polytex Blueprint, Inc., 562 Phil. 152, 159 (2007).

23 Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 121-122.

24 Id. at 554-595; rollo (Vol. Ii), pp. 596-643.

25 Commodity 258. [247] Concept of Unfair Labor Practice and Procedure for Prosecution Thereof - Unfair labor practices violate the ramble right of workers and employees to cocky-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their correct to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and common respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. x 10 x

26 Culili v. Eastern Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., 657 Phil. 342, 368 (2011).

27 Id.

28 UST Faculty Matrimony v. Academy of Santo Tomas, 602 Phil. 1016, 1025 (2009).

29 476 Phil. 346 (2004).

xxx Id. at 367.

31 Central Azucarera De Bais Employees Wedlock-NFL [CABEU-NFL} five. Central Azucarera De Bais, Inc. [CAB], 649 Phil. 629, 645 (2010).

32 Mercury Drug Corporation v. NLRC, 258 Phil. 384, 391 (1989).

33 General Credit Corporation v. A/sons Development and Investment Corporation, 542 Phil. 219, 231 (2007).

34 Philippine National Banking company 5. Andrada Electric Engineering science Company, 430 Phil. 882, 894 (2002).

35 Id. at 894-895

36 706 Phil. 297 (2013).

37 Id. at 309-312.

38 Id. at 313.

39 Id.

40 Pacific Rehouse Corporation v. CA, 730 Phil. 325, 352 (2014).

41 Rollo (Vol. Two), p. 851.

42 Pantranco Employees Association five. NLRC, 600 Phil. 645, 660 (2009).

43 Magsalin 5. National Organization of Working Men, 451 Phil. 254, 263 (2003).

44 Boga-Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. 1� NLRC, 357 Phil. 113, 126 (1998).

45 Rollo (Vol. I), p. 47.

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